Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) are introduced to give property buyers better information about the energy efficiency of dwellings, and provide incentives to make energy efficient investment. Previous studies on EPCs effect on property value has given divergent results, some studies find that energy label affect property value, while others find that energy labels have low or no effect. The present paper takes it one step further. Indeed, by using data on energy price in combination with transaction data from Oslo, we conclude not only that the energy label -but the energy performance of dwellings in general -has minor or no effect on transaction prices. This result falls in line with what is inferred by several survey studies; at the moment people buy a dwelling, they pay considerably less attention to the energy performance as compared to other factors, like the availability of garden and outdoor space, location, the neighborhood and the size of the property.
Introduction
In July 2010 the Energy Labeling System for Houses and Dwellings was implemented in Norway. The energy performance certification was fully mandatory from the beginning -all transactions must be accompanied by an energy performance certificate (EPC). The motivation for using EPCs is to provide reliable information to tenants and buyers about the energy performance of buildings in order to improve the functioning of real estate markets and generate incentives to invest in energy efficiency. The information provided to potential buyers by the EPC is supposed to stimulate energy efficiency investments because improved energy performance will potentially increase sale prices and rents of buildings (Bio Intelligence Service et al., 2013) .
The EPC reflects the expected energy consumption of a building, and makes buyers able to account for the expected current and future energy costs when assessing their willingness to pay for a resident. However, the expected energy costs are not only a function of energy consumption. Energy prices and the interest rate will also influence the energy costs -the latter working through the discounting of future values into present values. Hence, the EPCs will potentially influence the transaction prices of dwellings and houses under the influence of energy prices and the interest rate.
The empirical literature draws contrasting conclusions when it comes to the role played by EPCs in energy conservation. In the commercial office segment, a well known study by Eichholtz et al. (2010) found that US office buildings with a "green rating" sold for about 16 percent higher prices. Moreover, Brounen and Kok (2011) provided the first evidence of the economic impact of EPC implementation for residential dwellings. They performed a hedonic regression analysis based on some 170,000 housing transactions in the Netherlands and concluded that there is a price premium for houses labeled as more energy efficient.
Likewise, a report prepared for the European Commission concluded that EPCs have a significant impact on transaction prices and rents in selected E.U. countries (Bio Intelligence Service et al., 2013) .
Other studies indicate that EPCs have a weak or negligible impact on transaction prices.
Interestingly, just as Brounen and Kok (2011) , Murphy (2014) investigated the case of the Netherlands. She studied the role of the EPC in the transaction process of buildings in the Netherlands using an online questionnaire. Contrary to Brounen and Kok (2011) , she concluded that few householders use the EPC during the transaction process and maintains that the EPC will not have the intended impact even if fully implemented. Similar surveys carried out in the UK (Laine, 2011) and Germany (Amecke, 2012) drew the same conclusion:
that EPCs only have a modest or negligible impact on price negotiations and the purchaser decisions. Moreover, based on in-depth interviews with homeowners in ten European countries, as well as a large survey among homeowners in five European countries, Backhaus et al. (2011) concluded that the EPCs have a small or negligible impact on homeowners' investment decisions. Olaussen et al. (2017) carried out a statistical study resembling that of Brounen and Kok (2011) for the case of Norway. However, they draw a similar conclusion to that of Murphy (2014) . Performing a hedonic regression analysis based on housing transactions in Oslo, the capital of Norway, they conclude there is no price premium associated with energy labels in themselves. Indeed, they believe that the positive price effect of the EPCs of the former statistical studies is a result of the methodological design rather than evidence of the impact of EPCs. Olaussen et al. (2017) took advantage of the fact that energy labels were introduced by the government "overnight" on the 1st of July 2010 in Norway, meaning they had a quasi-natural experimental design with pre-and post-label data. For each dwelling that was sold before the implementation of the EPCs in Norway in 2010, their data made it possible to identify the energy label that the same dwelling was assigned to when sold in 2014. Using the assigned energy label of a dwelling that was resold in 2014 as a variable in a hedonic regression for dwellings sold before the implementation of the EPCs in 2010, they found the same positive relationship between the energy label and the transaction price of the dwellings. That is, the price premium of the energy label seemed to be present even before it was implemented. This strongly indicates that the energy label captured something else than the label itself.
However, Olaussen et al. (2017) , as well as many other earlier studies of the impact of EPCs on transaction prices, did not account for changes in the energy prices in their analyses. In fact, looking at the development of the energy price in Oslo, we see a trend where the energy price increases towards a top in 2010, and then decreases. As 2010 also was the year of implementation of the EPC in Norway, there is a chance that the lower energy price in the post-label period actually neutralizes a potential price premium of the EPC implementation.
In order to make a more comprehensive account of the impact of EPCs on transaction prices, we include a time series for the energy price in the analysis.
Based on the energy price time series, as well as extracting information about the expected energy consumption of buildings through their assigned energy label, we calculate the expected annual energy cost of buildings. Moreover, as Olaussen et al. (2017) , we take advantage of the fact that energy labels were introduced by the government "overnight" on the 1st of July 2010. For each dwelling that is sold before the implementation of the EPCs, we may therefore assign the expected annual energy cost that was calculated for the same dwelling when sold after 2010. By the aid of a hedonic regression, we are thus able to assess whether the post-label impact of the expected annual energy cost on transaction prices is stronger than the pre-label impact. Our results indicate that the impact of the expected energy costs on transaction prices is more moderate after the implementation of the EPCs.
The paper is organized as follows, section 2 describes the energy labeling system and some descriptive statistics. Section 3 describes the method and the result of the empirical analysis are presented in section 4. Discussion and concluding remarks are provided in section 5.
The Energy Labeling System of Dwellings and Houses
The In most of the member states, the energy performance ratings are expressed on a letter scale, for instance, from A to G, where A is very efficient and G very inefficient. As improved energy performance of buildings may increase sales prices and rents, the EPC is supposed to generate incentives among owners to invest in improving energy efficiency (Bio Intelligence Service et al., 2013) . However, the implementation of energy performance certificates has been slow in the EU. The implementation and quality of certification schemes vary from country to country, and it is held that "low ambition in implementation leads to certification schemes of poor quality, i.e., not providing sufficient and accurate information or the necessary quality control" (Bio Intelligence Service et al., 2013, p. 18 ).
Based on the EU's EPBD, the Energy Labeling System for Houses and Dwellings was fully implemented in Norway in July 2010. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy together with the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development had overall responsibility for its implementation, while the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate was appointed the managing body of the certification and inspection schemes (Isachsen et al., 2010 ). The energy performance certification was fully mandatory from the beginning; that is, since July 2010 all transactions must be accompanied by an EPC.
The EPC is a legal document and it is required that it be shown to the buyer. However, as noted by Isachsen et al. (2010, p.2) , "parts of the certificate, for instance the Energy Label, can be used as a short version." The document contains, among other things, data identifying the building and the agent responsible for issuing the certificate; the energy label that indicates the energy grade (representing the calculated delivered energy need) on a scale from A to G and the heating grade (representing to what extent heating of space and water can be done with renewable energy sources), which is represented by color; advice on energy that can save energy; and some general recommendations to the buyer (Isachsen et al., 2010) .
The operational liability of the EPC system in Norway is with ENOVA. The certification scheme is characterized by a self-assessment option for owners of existing apartments and buildings. In most cases, these certificates will be more general than those carried out by experts. The cost associated with the certification process for existing buildings is typically at least NOK 1000.
1 This includes the energy assessment itself and the extra cost of advertising for sale when energy label information is included. However, for new buildings, a qualified expert is required for certification, and it is hence a more costly process. The quality assurance aspect of the Norwegian certification scheme is attended to by controls in the market, where faulty inputs may be considered a breach of contract. In such cases, a fine may be issued. The transaction process is supervised by the Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE). The NVE carries out a systematic supervision of whether EPCs are presented at sale, whether the EPCs represent the building object, and whether experts meet the competence requirements (Isachsen et al., 2010) .
Method
We utilize two methods to analyze the effect of EPC on the value of dwellings when taking the present value of the energy price into account. Both methods build on Gordons dividend model in hedonic regression (Gordon and Shapiro 1956 ). In the first, the dividend model is utilized to calculate the expected value added of each energy label. This expected value added is compared with the estimate for actual value added estimated based on hedonic regression. The second method is a hedonic regression model where energy price and rate of discount is included in the model by using the present value of the expected energy cost as explanatory variable.
Calculating expected value added
Gordons growth model is written:
Where, V0 is the items value at time t=0, Dt is the expected dividend at time t, and r is the demand on return. When we use this model with respect to the dwelling and energy consumption, we can define V0 as the future energy cost, and Dt as the yearly energy cost of the dwelling. If the yearly energy cost is expected to grow with a yearly rate og g, we can rewrite the model:
In order to find the yearly energy cost Dt, we calculate the maxiumum energy consumption per square meter in the different energy label categories. This energy consumption is calculated based on the demands from the Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE). The formula for the different labels are presented in Table 1 . Since the only requirement for the G category is that the energy consumption is higher than in the G category, so we calculate this category by assuming it is 25% higher than in the F category.
This is due to the fact that 25% is the average difference between the F and the G category. Table 1 gives the maximum energy consumption associated with each energy label. A 100 m 2 apartment thus has a maximum limit of 105 kWh/m 2 (95+10000/100) for the energy consumption in order to earn the grade B. A dwelling without a heat pump and solar energy and build in accordance with the minimum requirements of the building regulations, will normally achieve the grade C. The grade B may be earned, for example, by installing a heat pump, to utilize solar energy or by improving the insulation of windows. The grade A is only achieved by dwellings where all measures of energy efficiency is taken. Few dwellings achieve the grades A and B. Table 2 and 3 below show the distribution of energy grades for small houses and apartments, respectively, while Table 4 presents the distribution (after 2010) and calculated distribution (before 2010) in our data. The energy consumption per square meter (kWh/m 2 ) is then used to calculate the yearly energy cost for each dwelling, and we have
where is the energy cost at time t. By applying the present value for the label A and subtract the present value of a dwelling in the B category, we find the expected value added of an A labeled dwelling.
This value added can be compared with the value added found in the market transaction data in order to test if the expected energy label premium is achieved in the market or not.
Estimating actual energy label premium
The real energy label price premium is estimated based on a hedonic regression model and real estate transaction data. The hedonic model is used to control for heterogeneity with respect to different characteristics and where dummy variables for the different energy labels are included.
Here, the logarithm of the price per square meter, P, is explained by a se of explanatory variables .
The explanatory variables are age, location, dwelling type, energy label and dwelling size, and t n  is the error term.
The explanatory variables are first the advertised energy labeling from A to G, and with F as the reference energy label (baseline). F is chosen instead of G as the baseline because it turns out the G category is a little bit special. The G category includes all instances of sellers neglecting to identify the correct energy label for their home, that is, a C label were the owner for some reason neglects to go through the classification procedure, will automatically be labeled with a G label. Second, Age measures the difference between the actual year of sale and the construction year. Since we suspect that this difference is less important the older the dwelling is, we measure age by 1/(sale yearconstruction year). This simply accounts for the fact that age is a relatively more important factor if we compare a brand new with a one year old dwelling than if we compare a twenty with a twenty-one year old building. Third, we have dummy variables for location based on the different city districts in Oslo, and where the district Frogner is the baseline. Fourth follows dwelling type, where we separate between single-family house, townhouses, and semi-detached houses with dummies, and where apartment is the baseline category. Fifth, we have dummy variables for different size categories based on square meters. Small is a dummy for square meters between 51 and 80, Medium is 81-120 square meters, and Large is above 120 square meters. The baseline size is hence below 50 square meters. We apply the log-linear (semilog) functional form in particular because coefficients can be more easily interpreted, and because the semilog functional form mitigates the statistical problem of heteroscedasticity (Malpezzi, 2003) . In total (T+1) periods are observed. Note that when ignoring the year dummies and the time subscript, we have the standard hedonic model. Hence, based on equation (4), we have two models to estimate, the "post-label" hedonic model (Model 1) and the "pre-label" hedonic model (Model 2).
Based on the results from the model we estimate the price per square meter for the reference dwelling, which is less than 50 square meter located at Frogner. We set the age of this dwelling to 5 years, and calculate the square meter price for all energy label categories. The price difference between the different labels is the actual value added achieved in the market that we compare with the expected value added.
Hedonic model with energy price and rate of discount
In order to examine how the energy label, energy price and rate of discount affect the price of the dwelling, a hedonic model where the energy label, rate of discount and energy price is represented through the expected energy cost. Hence we use the same model described above, but replace the energy label dummies the expected value of the energy costs given by:
Results
The yearly energy costs are used to calculate the present value of the different energy labels in Table 5 .
Note that there is a distinct difference in present values in 2009 and 2014. This difference is due to the discount rate being lower in 2014 at the same time as the energy cost were higher. The expected price premium of the energy labels in 2014 are presented in Table 6 while the expected price premium for 2009 is given in Table 7 . The price premiums are given per square meter, and if we look at an apartmenet of 40 square meters with the energy label C, the expected price premium is NOK 682 per square meter compared with a similar apartmenet with the energy label D. The same comparision in 2009 (Table 7 ) yields a price difference of NOK 502. The difference between the expected and actual value added in 2014 (Table 8) and 2009 (Table   9 ) is interesting. Comparing Table 6 with Table 8 , we find that the actual value added is higher than the expected price premium. This leaves the impression that dwellings with better energy label receives a higher premium than can be explained by the energy costs, that is, a value added beyond the cost savings expected from a more energy efficient dwelling. The pattern is confirmed in the 2009 tables (Table 7 and 9). This means that even before the energy labels were visible for the buyers, a price premium beyond what could be explained by the energy cost. However, these results are dependent on the rate of discount, and sensitivity analysis shows that if the rate of discount in 2014 was set at 4%, the difference between actual and expected price premium be much lower. The results from the hedonic model for the period after (post-label), Model 1, and before (prelabel), Model 2, the introduction of labels are presented in Table (districts), and where the district of Frogner is the baseline. The dummies Single-family house, townhouse and semi-detached houses are dummies for different housing types with apartments as the baseline. The dummies Small, Medium, and Large allow square meter prices to be different at different square meter levels. Small is dummy for Square meters between 51 and 80, Medium is 81-120 square meters, and Large is above 120 square meters. The baseline size is hence below 50 square meters. House prices are in fixed 2014 prices, where every dwelling price are multiplied with the house price index value for 2014 divided with the house price index value of the year the transaction.
As a robustness check to test the nature of the potential causal relationship between energy labels and sales price, we utilize the natural experiment that took place when the energy labels were made mandatory in July 2010 (Appendix). We compare the transaction prices of Again, we find no effect of energy labels, nor energy prices.
Discussion and concluding remarks
The energy performance certificate system was introduced in Norway and Europe in order to provide buyers with better information about the energy performance of dwellings. Some of the aim with this introduction is to give a more correct valuation of the dwelling when it is sold and give incentives to buyers to purchase energy efficient dwellings. Earlier studies in this area has given contradicting conclusions. Brounen and Kok (2011) found that there was a significant price premium associated with energy labels in the real estate market in the Netherlands, while other studies, like Murphy (2014) found little or no effect of energy labels in the same market.
The present paper follows up on Olaussen et al. (2017) of the Norwegian real estate market.
By replicating the hedonic model by Brounen and Kok (2011) on Norwegian data they found the same results, but by running a fixed effect model with data before and after the introduction of energy labels in 2010, they found that something else than the energy label must explain the apparent price premium. One potential explanation for this is that the energy efficiency of the dwelling was known to the buyers even before the labeling system was issued. In order to test for this we use the energy price over time to see if the cost of energy may be the underlying explanation. By controlling for the present value of the expected energy consumption, we find no evidence of energy costs being important for the energy label premium.
By applying data for energy prices and the rate of discount, and the associated demands for the different energy label categories, we calculate the expected price premium of dwellings with better energy labels should get compared with similar dwellings with lower energy labels.
These price premiums are then compared with the actual price premiums estimated in the hedonic models. The analyses shows that the actual price premiums are much higher than the expected price premiums based on the energy cost differences. Moreover, we find this difference both before and after the energy labels system was introduced. In addition, we find no significant differences in the actual price premium before and after the introduction of the energy labels in 2010. Moreover, the robustness check where we apply the repeated sales method provides the same results, that is, we find no effect of the present value of energy costs on the price of dwellings.
These results supports the previous results in the literature that the energy label does not affect the price of dwellings at the time of sale. There are hence reasons to believe that when it is found that energy labels are associated with price premiums, this is due to other explanations than the energy labels itself. One explanation may be that the buyers are well informed about the energy efficiency of the dwellings even without the energy labels, and hence also before the energy label system was introduced. Another explanation may be that we have omitted explanatory variables in our models. One potential omitted variable may be the standard of the dwelling, e.g. how recently it was renovated. This omitted variable was visible for the buyers before the energy label system was introduced, and it is quite likely that the standard is closely correlated with the energy efficiency. Hence, it may be that the price premium associated with the energy label is explained by the standard of the dwelling, but data on when dwellings were renovated is not easily accessible. A detailed and indepth study of this potential omitted variable may be a fruitful path for future research.  is the error term. The residuals are assumed to have zero means, constant variances, and to be mutually independent. However, the variance of the residuals may increase with the time interval between the sales in the transaction pairs, and hence violate the assumption of constant residual variance Shiller, 1987, 1989) . Such residual heterogeneity may for instance be due to the fact that it is more likely that unobserved characteristics have changed for transaction pairs that span long time intervals. We follow the three-step procedure suggested by Case and Schiller (1987) to take into account this potential heterogeneity, so that transaction pairs over long time intervals are given less weight than transaction pairs within shorter time intervals. The resulting indices represent the expected values of the geometric mean of the house price growth rates.
The data set contains no dwelling constructed before 2010 with energy label A and only 11 dwellings with energy label B constructed before 2010. This leaves us with too few observations to construct house price indices for dwellings with the two highest energy labels. We construct house price indices for the rest of the energy labels (C to G) in addition to a main index (all) that includes the A and B labels.
To test whether variables are stationary, we use a simple Dickey-Fuller test (Table A1 ). All the variables have one unit root, and we therefore differentiate them to make them stationary.
To test for autocorrelation we use a Durbin-Watson test and a portmanteau test for white noise. Since there is indication of autocorrelation AR(1), we apply a Prais-Winsten regression (Prais and Winsten,1954) to reduce the problem. The method assumes that the error term in the residuals is AR(1) noise with a serial autocorrelation of ρ. By estimating ρ, we transform our variables, obtaining new estimates for slopes and intercept and new residuals. As long as we still have autocorrelations in our residuals, we redo the process until we find a ρ without autocorrelation in the corresponding residuals.
Our regression is: 
Repeat sales results
To explore the effect of introducing energy labels, we construct price indices for the different labels, and let them all have a value 100 in the year 2000. To explore the effect of introducing energy labels, we construct price indices for the different labels, and let them all have a value 100 in the year 2000. The indices are presented in Figure AI . The adjusted R-squares range from 0.23 for the G group to 0.78 in the F group, while the Prais-Winsten transformed Durbin-Watson statistics range from 1.39 to 2.46, which means we keep the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. 2 If energy labeling has the price effect found in the hedonic data, we should expect a kink with increasing slope after July 2010 for the highest energy labels.
However, it is hard to see any shift taking place in July 2010. This is confirmed in Table A2, where the dependent variable is the house price in the different energy label categories, and where we regress on the main index as well a dummy variable for the second part of 2010, when the energy label was made mandatory. If energy labeling has the price effect found in the hedonic data, we should expect significant dummy coefficients in Table A2 . However, none of the dummies are significant. Hence, despite the strong label effect demonstrated in the hedonic post-label model (Model 1), just as in the pre-label hedonic recression (Model 2), we find no evidence to support the price premium effect. 
